South Sudan’s Militias

By Mayank Bubna

Introduction and executive summary

South Sudan’s remarkably peaceful referendum momentarily assuaged concerns about violence in the region, but outbreaks of intense fighting in Jonglei on February 9 and 10 that left hundreds dead, and in the flashpoint town of Malakal on February 4, provide stark reminders of the tensions that remain. This report, based on extensive interviews conducted in Upper Nile state in January and February 2011, provides an overview of the state of play among South Sudan’s militias, which continue to be a critical challenge to securing a peaceful separation between North and South Sudan, and to the formation of a stable new state.

One reason why the referendum took place relatively peacefully in flashpoint regions was the concerted effort on the part of the South Sudanese government to reconcile with breakaway militia leaders beforehand. The olive branch that was offered appeared to be accepted by a number of key militia leaders. But just weeks after the announcement of the South’s overwhelming preference for secession, intense fighting broke out once more, amid allegations of support from Khartoum for the dissidents.

Significant hurdles remain before peace in South Sudan can be assured for the long-term. Any future peace agreements between the South Sudanese government and dissident elements will face serious challenges in their implementation and remain vulnerable to security threats from spoilers—both from Khartoum and from splintering within the militias themselves. Operationally, integrating militia members into the SPLA is complex and will come at a long-term cost for a government that must eventually reduce the size of its military and disarm its civilian population.

Although there is a deep and explicit desire among southerners to reconcile with armed nonstate actors, the situation is extremely fragile and high levels of distrust prevail. Ultimately, confidence-building and addressing the root causes of conflict in the South takes time and action, and cannot be achieved simply through paper contracts. U.N. representative David Gressly has warily remarked, “The signature of the peace agreement is only the first step. Implementing it is the hard part.”
Some of the key elements in a comprehensive strategy for neutralizing militia groups in South Sudan are the following:

• An unpalatable but necessary strategy of co-option of militia leaders through negotiations that offer integration into the GOSS army as well as other perquisites.

• A more fulsome disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program for rank and file militia members who wish to leave military service, and integration into the southern Sudanese army for those that want to remain.

• A demonstrated commitment by the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement toward inclusive governance, in the form of a democratic constitutional review process and independent political party and civil society development.

• A concerted strategy by the southern army, as well as local security forces and police, for protecting civilians in future attacks.

• A targeted military strategy for recalcitrant militia elements that reject options for integration and pose a threat to civilians, undertaken with international monitoring and in line with human rights standards.

Cast of characters

The current relationship between the southern government and militia elements is a product of Sudan’s unique social, economic, and political history. Constantly shifting alliances among and within the militias further complicate efforts to understand these dynamics and identify individual agendas. Coalitions form and break for many reasons including but not limited to tribal affiliations, turf gains, recruitment drives, and resource control.

Although all parties have publicly supported a cessation of hostilities, reconciliation efforts remain fragile and vulnerable to spoilers, as seen in the most recent violence. Some militia leaders envision themselves in positions of power in the government or armed forces, while others are looking for substantial payouts for their loyalty, and are interested only in personal gain. The level of support and number of men that each militia leader commands is unclear, and the effectiveness of each group in combat has varied. All have been very opaque in terms of their overall goals, and there is considerable variation in how each group’s agenda can be interpreted.
Here is a rundown of the current positions of the major players:

**The Government of South Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (GOSS/SPLA)**—Ever since President Kiir issued an official pardon to all armed groups in South Sudan, GOSS and the SPLA have indicated a willingness to overlook past atrocities and welcome dissident elements back into the government and army. GOSS’s stance has remained in line with the October amnesty that President Kiir granted to all militia operators in South Sudan—reconcile these armed elements, and welcome them back into society as brothers. Whether the latest incidents will change the southern government’s tactic remains to be seen.

**Gabriel Tanginy**—A Nuer from the Upper Nile region, Tanginye is a close collaborator with the Sudanese government and army, or SAF, and is perhaps the most disruptive of the entire lot of militias despite his acceptance of a presidential pardon in October 2010. He is considered responsible for the skirmishes in Malakal in 2006 and 2009 that left several hundred people dead and displaced thousands more. Tanginye’s followers now serve in the northern half of the joint North-South military unit in Malakal, known as the SAF JIU. He remains an outsider as far as Upper Nile state officials are concerned, who call him a “lost chief” and “not a guy you can predict, talk to, or sign an agreement with.” Tanginye is known to be a war profiteer, and has been losing support from his own men. Despite his amnesty, there is widespread feeling among southerners that he is better off staying in Khartoum, where he currently resides. He has made three trips to Upper Nile in the past few months—the last one around New Year. A top South Sudanese official recently alleged that Tanginye has realigned with the North and has recently returned to the South armed.

**Lt. General George Athor**—A man with strong historical ties to the SPLA, Athor signed a ceasefire agreement with the southern government just before the referendum. He came into the limelight after the April elections last year when, after losing the Jonglei governor’s race, he decided to form his own armed faction, drawing manpower from unemployed and criminal civilians from the Lou-Nuer and Gaweir-Nuer areas. The number of men under his control has swelled to one battalion, approximately 750 men, according to some accounts. Athor had earlier rejected the amnesty call by the president, but signed the January ceasefire agreement because of strategic land and other concessions given to him as part of the negotiated package. Until recently, Athor appeared more amenable to compromise than some other militia leaders because his disagreements were narrower in scope. Among southern officials, the
sentiment toward Athor remained, “He’s our guy.” The attack in February brought an end to the January ceasefire agreement and shows that Athor is capable of continuing to wreak havoc in the South.

Gordon Kong—One of the foremost leaders of Anyanya II, Kong fought the SPLA for several years before joining forces with Riek Machar during the 1991 Nasir split in the SPLA. When Machar rejoined the SPLA movement, Kong remained on the Khartoum side. A former deputy of Paulino Matip, Kong has drawn his support from the Nuer-dominated Nasir area of Upper Nile. Kong lives in Khartoum, commands Tanginye, and maintains large numbers of loyalist armed elements in the North and South that are members of the SAF JIUs. Some speculate that Kong might return and join the South should it secede from the North. However, GOSS has yet to clarify its arrangements for him and his men, and until this happens Kong will continue to remain aligned with the North.

Commander Olong—A Shilluk tradesman with a shop in Pigi County in Jonglei, Olong allied with Athor against the SPLA when armed Dinka groups began imposing taxes on Pigi County’s community members. Olong received financial and material support from Lam Akol’s SPLM-DC, and has successfully managed to recruit several hundred fighters, with the numbers growing. Olong was last seen in Malakal in the first week of January of this year where he openly recruited 300 additional men in the Rei Mesir neighborhood. Thereafter, his men were taken by two boats to the SPLA Division 7 headquarters in Upper Nile to be integrated into the SPLA. They remain in this SPLA camp to date.

Thomas Mabor Dhol—A Nuer, Mabor, like Tanginye, remains “unpredictable,” according to some Upper Nile officials. Although some of his men were integrated into the SPLA under the Juba Declaration, many of his men remain at large. A significant portion of them are part of the SAF JIU unit in Malakal which recently came very close to a firefight with Tanginye’s men in Malakal, also in the SAF JIU. Like Tanginye, he is motivated by money but is losing some support from his men because of his decision to continue staying in Khartoum.

Gatluak Gai—A Nuer dissident and a “stray bullet” who turned down President Kiir’s earlier pardon, Gai maintains contact with Upper Nile’s militia leaders and poses a serious threat to the stability of Unity state. On January 7, Gai’s men engaged in a series of confrontations with the SPLA along Mayom road, which lasted until the next morning. Three SPLA soldiers were wounded with one killed, and eight of Gai’s men were killed with more than 25 apprehended. On the 9th, they were transported to Bentiu for interrogation, leading to more armed confrontations that afternoon. Gai’s motivations for the attacks are not clear.

Bapiny Minutuel Wijang—A Nuer, Minutuel is a high-ranking SAF officer who prefers working behind the scenes. Minutuel reportedly maintains ties to Gai and Tanginye and is a channel to financial support from Khartoum. He allegedly instigated Gai’s
attack on SPLA soldiers in Mayom while the referendum voting process was ongoing. He was also seen accompanying Tanginye to Juba when Tanginye arrived to accept Kiir’s amnesty.

David Yauyau—A civilian-turned-militia leader who also rose in protest of the April 2010 election results in Jonglei, Yauyau commands a predominantly youth-led group. Yauyau is considered less of a threat to South Sudan’s politics, but remains a viable opposition force in Pibor County in Jonglei State. Yauyau’s forces engaged with some SPLA troops just before the referendum. Despite the government’s earlier advances for peace, no real commitment on his part has emerged.

Reconciliation challenges

The olive branch extended by the South Sudanese government to militias in the months leading up to the referendum was a positive step toward the goal of reconciliation in South Sudan. But as demonstrated by recent violence, the South Sudanese government has considerable work to do before removing the threat to stability that armed groups pose. Here are some of the challenges:

Infighting within militia groups

Divisions and weak command and control within many of the militia groups may compromise the implementation of any reconciliation agreement with the southern government. Some of the militia leaders have experienced difficulty maintaining control over their field-based units, while among many militia rank and file there is a sense of disconnect from, and even distrust of, their commanders.

The SAF-JIU in Malakal are composed of different groups: militias from Fangak who are loyal to Tanginye, Mabor Dhol’s men, Kong’s elements, Dinka forces, some from Bahr-el Ghazal, Murle from western Jonglei, and a couple from the regular Sudan army. The commander, General Adil Athief el-Amin, is a northerner from SAF. For the SAF-JIU in Malakal, the fact that many of the commanders are based in Khartoum has raised doubts and suspicion among men on the ground about the commander’s commitment to the group. This sense of uncertainty, reinforced by Tanginye’s acceptance of the government’s amnesty deal in October, led to two recent incidents within the unit.

On December 24, 2010, Tanginye arrived unannounced in Malakal with the dead body of a community elder, claiming that he was visiting to attend the burial ceremony. Some of his subordinates within the SAF JIU who were not informed of his visit grew suspicious of Tanginye’s intentions. They assumed that he was in Malakal to try and illegally acquire arms and men from the SAF-JIU and that he was going to abandon them. Rumors of Tanginye’s betrayal rapidly grew into the fear that the militia leader would
capture JIU arms and use them to attack Malakal. General el-Amin, who had not been briefed on Tanginye’s visit, was thrown into panic and immediately set up defensive positions within the JIU headquarters.

Tanginye’s men split into two camps. His loyalists joined hands with elements belonging to Gordon Kong and threatened to use 12.7 mm guns. Tanginye’s nonsupporters teamed up with Mabor’s forces and men from the Dinka and Murle to form defense columns with 10 tanks, artillery, and air defense arms. As the situation bordered on bloodshed, the governor quickly intervened and calmed both sides down, but the situation within the SAF-JIU did not return to normal. According to one source, “Things are better and [the JIU militias and Tanginye’s men] are together now but there is no trust. They lost trust between themselves.” Although people suspect that Tanginye’s visit was deliberately timed to disrupt referendum activities, there is no denying that these calculations have led to a weakening of support from his core group, and may very well have factionalized it.

In a second incident in February, Tanginye’s men—who were left without any guarantee of amnesty or reconciliation with the southern government—mutinied when their weaponry was moved to the North, leaving an estimated 50 people dead. The SAF-JIU’s deputy, Commander Yien, gained control over many of Tanginye’s men in the JIU unit, and tried to prevent SAF forces from moving north with their tanks and military equipment, in another example of the level of discord and anxiety in the unit.

Among George Athor’s forces, growing discontentment appears more related to unfulfilled promises. The former SPLA general drew support mainly from homeless, jobless civilians to whom he offered the possibility of becoming part of South Sudan’s armed forces. However, after months of living in the bush, and tolerating Athor’s legendarily distrusting attitude, they have become increasingly frustrated.

“Even his own wives don’t trust him anymore,” confides one of Athor’s former associates. “They are leaving him and coming back.” According to officials working in Pigi County, where Athor operates, his men are feeling “caged” and “like being in a zoo.” They cannot return to their communities because they will be identified and killed, so they have no choice but to stay with him. “They are stuck with him till the ceasefire is implemented,” said this aforementioned official. “They have no choice but to fight.”
“These are situational commanders, not professional ones,” said one SPLA officer. “They have no qualification but they know how to kill and how to mobilize people to go and die.”

Thus far, the South Sudanese government has attempted to bring militias in by negotiating with its leaders. Such a tactic fails to account for the divisions among the rank and file of many of these groups and leaves agreements vulnerable to splintering within the militias themselves.

**Integrating into the SPLA**

Absorbing militias into the SPLA is a considerable operational challenge and will have ranging economic, social, and political implications.

For one, offering large financial rewards and remuneration to untrained civilians will only exacerbate the financial burden that the army already faces as it attempts to downsize. Some men like Tanginye can be induced only by the monetary packages placed in front of them, and there is fear that a big payout to him would encourage others to follow in his footsteps.

The South Sudanese leadership also does not yet have a clear plan on how to assign rank to incoming militia members. For example, Athor has arbitrarily ranked his men, most of whom are civilians with no prior military training or expertise, and these men expect to keep these positions once they are integrated. Given the SPLA’s own legacy of having once been a bush army, the militias feel that there are no standards or requirements necessary to assimilate into the existing force structure. Some high-level officers in the SPLA say that they will give incoming militia members titles and positions if they have to, for the sake of unity and peace. “We won’t have a problem if civilians are given high ranks because the objective is to maintain peace and liberate our people,” said one officer. “I have been saluting since the beginning up to now, even those who should not be saluted, and I will salute anyone if it helps unify our people.”

Others, however, are less comfortable with the idea of one day counting the militia among their comrades. “These are men who, at one point, we used to send to bring water for us, who we fought, and who are untrained,” said one field officer. “If they have big ranks it is not good.”

“They say, I am a colonel or I am a general. But these people have never been in the military before,” said one state official. “They just accept it from their leaders who have given them these ranks. If you look for past records for these people, there are none.”

No decision has been taken on where to place militia leaders themselves. “Where do you put Tanginye,” ponders one official. “In 2005 we managed to create a position called
Deputy Commander in Chief for Paulino Matip. Now if Tanginye comes, will there be a deputy to the deputy? It’s a really difficult issue for us.”

Yet another question is the social effect that integrating militias into the army will have. Impunity is rife among the militias and was in some ways reinforced by the amnesty offered by the South Sudanese government, which pardoned all war crimes and abuses committed by dissident elements. Some officers fear this culture of impunity could worsen discipline within the SPLA.

Hastily Written, Quickly Broken: The Athor Ceasefire Agreement

On Wednesday, January 5, 2011, renegade Lieutenant General George Athor and his forces signed a ceasefire agreement, or CFA, with the South Sudanese government. The landmark accord came after weeks of mediation by a high-level committee of church leaders, the United Nations, and the South Sudanese leadership. The 11-point agreement paved the way for the integration of nonstate armed actors under Athor’s command into the military and government, and nominally includes two other militias not under Athor’s forces.

The ceasefire agreement established a ceasefire zone that encompasses parts of Unity and Jonglei states—areas of operation for militia leaders Gatluak Gai and David Yauyau. It also laid out a timeline and locations for Athor’s troops to assemble and begin to integrate into the army. The text of the agreement remained vague and ambiguous about many important points. Many of the ceasefire modalities and procedures were ironed out in a last phone call between Vice President Riek Machar and Athor.16

Details about the integration process, including assignment of ranks and economic incentives were conveniently omitted. No specifics have been laid out with regard to the number of nonstate armed elements that are expected to integrate. The SPLA/GOSS team quietly acknowledges that there are no modalities currently in place to deal with these questions and hence could not be included as part of the formal arrangement.

The agreement left an uneasy potential for insecurity—the militias were given a huge compensation package that they could use to co-opt other forces.17 GOSS officials thought however, that this was a risk they must accept in order to continue to build upon the spirit of inclusiveness from the earlier South-South amnesty. Additionally, conversations with some of the delegates on the agreement’s implementation panel indicated that the choice of assembly areas was a major point of contention during the negotiations with Athor. The places that were finally chosen are significant because they sit on major land and river supply routes for Jonglei and Upper Nile. They offer easy connectivity and serve as entry points to other assembly areas, leaving open the possibility of a quick return to rebellion on Athor’s part. According to one highly placed source, Athor agreed to sign the CFA because he was given these concessions to keep his troops regularly furnished.

On February 9 and 10, intense fighting broke out between Athor and the SPLA. Over 200 people reportedly died, a large proportion of which were civilians, many women and children. Fighting took place in the northwestern corner of Jonglei in Fangak County, but why clashes took place remains unclear. New weapons and uniforms were reportedly found on those dead on Athor’s side.18
Outsized egos and personalities

While the government of South Sudan has made attempts to formalize a single process for all militias, it has found itself having to strike individual deals with militia leaders that appeal to their sensitive demeanors and egos. Although undoubtedly necessary, this approach has also proved dangerous in the way that it has inflated the leaders’ sense of importance and led to competition among them for the spoils of war.

Negotiating separate packages for each armed group risks giving each militia leader undue importance and makes serious decision-making dependent on the whims of individuals whose tempers have been known to flare with little or no provocation. Athor, displeased with the way the ceasefire negotiations were being handled by the high-level presidential delegation, attacked SPLA units near Koliet Boma in Pigi County on December 19, two days after the initial rounds of discussion with the delegation. Twenty-six SPLA soldiers were killed in the firefight, but the incident was overlooked by the GOSS/SPLA who pressed on to try and get Athor back to the negotiating table.

Recently, Gatluak Gai rejected Riek Machar’s appeals to peace, claiming in a public broadcast via a state radio station that Machar was “unworthy” of the deal because he had insulted him by failing to intervene in last year’s elections. Gai said he could only talk to Gov. Taban and President Kiir directly, in what could be seen as an attempt to assert his own self-importance while at the same time delaying substantive talks.

Competition between the militia leaders, who eye other leaders’ deals with GOSS, also makes peace talks highly delicate. When Athor signed the peace deal, he claimed to represent Gatluak Gai and David YauYau as well. Gai, who perhaps was not thrilled about Athor stealing his limelight, felt that he had been sidelined. This might, some claim, have been one of his motivations for conducting the January attacks on the SPLA in Unity State’s Mayom County.

Post-referendum negotiation dynamics are bound to change given each party’s ongoing strategic calculations of their own positions of strength and weakness. So far, GOSS and the SPLA have had to play a careful balancing act to ensure that no one group has felt marginalized. The GOSS’s adulatory attitude toward the militias thus far, threatens to trivialize the agreement to cosmetic arrangements rather than sustainable long-term peacebuilding.

The post-conflict context

In communities affected by these militias, there remain important questions regarding plans for peacebuilding, justice, and reconciliation—questions that have so far been set aside in the South’s haste to reconcile before the referendum. This will be all the more important in cases where civilians were actually recruited from these communities and need to be reintegrated.
Malakal and Pigi County’s civilians remain among the worst affected as a result of the militia wars, raising the important question of how the southern government will rebuild communities and address issues of justice. Law and order continues to remain weak with no real channels for civilians to seek recourse. Local peace committees and civil society groups have had nominal impact in terms of alleviating people’s suffering and pain. While the violence has been targeted mainly at the SPLA in some cases, in others, the presence of these militias has hurt the very populace among whom they live.

Internally displaced persons from Koliet boma (now residing in Pigi County) who fled an Athor attack in November describe how his men burned everything and killed or wounded people indiscriminately. About one hundred people were forced to flee without their belongings and have no way of returning to their homes. They express doubts about Athor’s commitments to any peace deal. “We don’t know if he will honor any such agreement,” they said.

Many militia leaders like Commander Olong and Athor have openly recruited civilians, even forcing them to serve in their ranks. They have financed their war efforts through cattle-raiding and looting villages, and allowed their cadres to engage in extortion and stealing at gun point. “He gives you a gun and says you bring cows for feeding the forces,” said one SPLA officer. Their activities have affected local economies and caused large scale displacement of populations.

“We feel safe for now, but not confident,” said one Pigi County official. “We will not be confident until we see Athor in Juba. There is no guarantee that there will be peace, and that’s what we need—a guarantee.” No mechanism is currently in place to deal with justice for the civilian survivors of war, and little has been done toward rebuilding people’s trust and confidence.

The northern government

The North’s involvement with southern militias is a problematic and least understood part of the puzzle. Every southerner Enough spoke to cited the same reasons for the North’s motivations for allegedly fuelling the South’s internal strife—disturbing the South’s peace, disrupting the referendum, and discrediting the southern government. That the North is offering material and financial assistance to dissident elements is widely-believed in the South, not least because of a long history of such a strategy.

Most militia leaders live in Khartoum where they enjoy the patronage and security that GOS offers. For those who remain in South Sudan, the North periodically sends provisions and encouragement to maintain ties, according to southern officials and security officers. Many allege that Khartoum is using oil companies based in the South to aid in
the delivery of supplies, knowing that these companies remain out of bounds for southerners. Most of the employees within the oil companies are northerners, and despite a recent government security arrangement, southern security officers have little access to the oil fields. “We don’t know exactly what is happening inside the oil companies’ areas,” said one Upper Nile official. “There could be lots of weapons inside, but we don’t have a good idea.” A recent incident in Upper Nile illustrates this best. 

In September 2010, a Sudanese helicopter carrying arms and supplies landed to refuel in Paloich, Upper Nile, on one of PetroDar’s airstrips. The pilot and the captain claimed that they were headed to Pagak, another district. The helicopter was allowed to refuel and take off. In the interim, SPLA officers in Paloich received intelligence from their counterparts in Khartoum that the helicopter was delivering supplies to Athor’s forces. Phone calls made to relevant airport authorities revealed that the helicopter in fact never landed in Pagak, but rather rerouted to Athor’s hideout. When the helicopter returned to PetroDar’s air base, officers found seven of Athor’s men inside, who were being transported to Khartoum. They tried to escape upon being recognized, but were immediately apprehended. The crew, which was comprised of a handful of internationals, was also detained. The foreigners were later released, but Athor’s men continue to remain under arrest in Juba.

Now that the referendum process is complete, it is difficult to predict at this stage whether or not the North’s strategy towards the South will change, and whether or not they will continue to support southern militias in light of the new geopolitical structure.

Addressing fundamental grievances

Many of the uprisings in the South appear fueled by political, economic, and/or ethnic grievances that have been exacerbated by government decisions. Gatluak Gai, George Athor, as well as David Yauyau all rebelled in the weeks following the April elections, a vote during which widespread human rights violations by SPLM-affiliated security forces were committed. The elections consolidated the SPLM’s political hegemony, and further estranged many opposition, independent, and youth groups. Similarly, resentments vis-à-vis what is perceived as a Dinka-dominated government and army and questions of the level of corruption in government still simmer. As the South Sudanese government embarks on a crucial transitional period of state-building, it has an opportunity to address some of the root causes for continued violence in the South, and diminish the divisions and grievances within its populace that motivates its people to take up arms and that are vulnerable to external opportunism. Concrete steps toward good governance, including an inclusive constitutional review and democratic elections, are necessary aspects of reconciliation in the South.
Conclusion

The challenge that internal insecurity poses to the South is immense and the strategies to address that challenge complex and slow. As euphoria over the South’s decisive vote for independence fades, a key responsibility that the South Sudanese government and army must quickly assume is the protection of its civilians. Truly mitigating threats from militias, though, will necessitate not only reconciling and integrating dissident elements, but structural changes to the army and government themselves. These obstacles toward peace are primarily the responsibility of South Sudan’s leaders, but the international community also has a supporting role to play. Having helped broker the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and usher in a historic vote for independence earlier this year, the international community has had a history of positive engagement with Sudan; it should capitalize on these efforts to see that peace prevails in South Sudan for the long term. Significant steps have been made in the direction toward peace in South Sudan, and this momentum must be maintained.
Endnotes

1 Enough Interview with Upper Nile State Officials.
3 Enough Interviews with SPLA soldiers in Pigi County.
4 Anyanya II was a collection of guerrillas that remained dissatisfied by the Addis Ababa Agreement that ended the First Civil War and fought the southern regional government. They became the nucleus of the SPLA at the start of the Second Sudanese Civil War.
5 Enough Interviews with Upper Nile State officials.
6 Enough Interviews with Upper Nile State officials.
7 Enough Interview with Pigi County official.
8 Enough Interviews with Upper Nile State officials.
9 Enough Interview with official in Unity State.
10 Enough Interviews with Upper Nile State officials.
12 The following account was narrated and supported by Upper Nile government officials, Gov. Simon Kun and JIU SPLA commander, Brigadier General Peter Gai Gatwech.
13 Although Tanginye has not formally been given a green light to return to Malakal, he has showed up three times in the last few months, always under the pretext of mourning for a dead elder.
14 It is unclear why or how these particular coalitions came about to be, but it suggests that the militia leaders have not been able to consolidate their men, who could easily be co-opted by more organized confrontations.
15 Enough Interviews with Pigi County officials and civilians.
16 Vice President Riek Machar’s speech during ceasefire agreement ceremony, January 5, 2011.
17 Enough interviews with Upper Nile state officials.
18 Enough phone interview with SPLA soldiers in Upper Nile.
20 The following account was confirmed by various Upper Nile state officials including the governor and deputy governor.
21 Enough interviews with Upper Nile state officials.
22 It was later discovered that the helicopter, flying under a Sudanese flag, had been used all over the South but no one had checked into its flight details or activities until this incident. It is now being kept in Juba’s airport.
Enough is a project of the Center for American Progress to end genocide and crimes against humanity. Founded in 2007, Enough focuses on the crises in Sudan, eastern Congo, and areas affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army. Enough’s strategy papers and briefings provide sharp field analysis and targeted policy recommendations based on a “3P” crisis response strategy: promoting durable peace, providing civilian protection, and punishing perpetrators of atrocities. Enough works with concerned citizens, advocates, and policy makers to prevent, mitigate, and resolve these crises. To learn more about Enough and what you can do to help, go to www.enoughproject.org.